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Abstract—Modern smart grids rely on advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI) networks for monitoring and billing pur-
poses. However, such an approach suffers from electricity theft
cyberattacks. Different from the existing research that utilizes
shallow, static, and customer-specific-based electricity theft de-
tectors, this paper proposes a generalized deep recurrent neural
network (RNN)-based electricity theft detector that can effectively
thwart these cyberattacks. The proposed model exploits the
time series nature of the customers’ electricity consumption to
implement a gated recurrent unit (GRU)-RNN, hence, improving
the detection performance. In addition, the proposed RNN-based
detector adopts a random search analysis in its learning stage
to appropriately fine-tune its hyper-parameters. Extensive test
studies are carried out to investigate the detector’s performance
using publicly available real data of 107,200 energy consumption
days from 200 customers. Simulation results demonstrate the
superior performance of the proposed detector compared with
state-of-the-art electricity theft detectors.
Index Terms—Electricity theft detection, cyberattacks, AMI
networks, deep machine learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electricity theft results in high financial losses for several
countries such as the United States ($6 billion/year) and
India ($17 billion/year) [1], [2]. Other developing countries
lose almost 50% of their electricity revenue due to theft [3].
Recently, advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) networks are
utilized within smart grids for monitoring, asset management,
and billing purposes. The AMI networks rely on smart meters
located in the customers’ premises to regularly report their
energy consumption. This approach has the potential to hin-
der traditional physical electricity theft attacks including line
hooking or meter tampering [4]. Nevertheless, a new category
of electricity theft attacks that target the AMI networks has
appeared, namely electricity theft cyberattacks. These attacks
jeopardize the integrity of the customer’s energy consumption
data as malicious customers hack into their smart meters to
manipulate their own energy consumption values. Despite the
difficulties associated with detecting such cyberattacks, the
customers’ fine-grained energy consumption data is considered
to be a promising tool that can be used to boost automated
electricity theft detection mechanisms.
Several automated theft detection techniques have been pro-
posed in literature [5]–[17]. These detection techniques can
be categorized into three main groups: machine learning, state
estimation, and game theory-based techniques. Compared with
these techniques, machine learning-based techniques present
the most mature and effective mechanism to tackle this problem
due to their superior detection rate on real datasets [1]. How-
ever, the existing techniques suffer from several limitations.
First, the existing detectors employ shallow machine learning
architectures such as support vector machines (SVMs), while
deep learning architectures can better capture the behavior
of the input data resulting in a higher detection rate. In
addition, the existing detectors rely on static input data [1],
[13], however, exploiting the temporal correlation within the
time series energy consumption data of the customers can
further enhance the detection performance. Moreover, some of
the existing works [1] adopt customer-specific models, where a
detector’s model is developed for each customer using only
its energy consumption data in order to detect any future
thefts. However, customer-specific models are not practical
due to several reasons. On one hand, it would be impossible
to train new detector models for new customers joining the
system as these new customers do not have any historical
energy consumption records. Furthermore, customer-specific
detectors are not robust against contamination attacks, where
the customer data that is used to train the detector is already
malicious yet falsely labeled as honest data to confuse the
detector.
In this work, our objective is to develop a generalized deep
recurrent neural network (RNN)-based electricity theft detector.
In specific, RNNs offer a considerable leverage while working
with time series data since it is represented as a feedback
network where the output at the current state is the input for the
next state. To the best of our knowledge, only [14] investigates
the application of deep neural networks for electricity theft
detection. While a long-short-term-memory (LSTM) architec-
ture of RNNs is investigated in [14] to tackle the electricity
theft detection problem, a comprehensive study is needed to
assess the performance of RNN-based detectors on real energy
consumption data sets. In addition, further investigation should
be considered in tuning the network hyper-parameters to further
improve the training time and the model’s performance.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose a generalized RNN-based electricity theft
detector using hidden gated recurrent unit (GRU) layers.
The generality of the model stems from its training on the
energy consumption load profiles of different residential
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customers’ patterns.
• We carry out hyper-parameter tuning based on a random
search to further improve the performance. Random search
is proven to outperform grid search by finding a good
hyper-parameter set in faster execution time [18].
• We evaluate the performance of the proposed detector
using publicly available real data of 107, 200 energy con-
sumption days from 200 customers against a set of differ-
ent types of cyber attacks. Simulation results demonstrate
the robustness of the proposed model against existing
detectors.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews the related work. Energy consumption data is presented
in Section III. The proposed detection approach is explained in
Section IV. Simulation results and discussions are presented in
Section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Several studies have addressed the problem of detecting
electricity theft in the literature. Machine learning studies are
the most pertinent to the proposed work. In [5], the authors
compared the performance of two classification algorithms
based on single feedforward neural network, namely, extreme
learning machine (ELM), and online sequential extreme learn-
ing machine (OSELM), against SVM. The proposed approach
was able to achieve 70% classification rate with ELM. Shallow
SVM based detector has also been employed in [19] and
achieved a detection accuracy up to 60% on real data set. The
performance of this detector was further improved in [6] to
reach an accuracy of 72% using a fuzzy inference system as a
post-processing stage. A graph-based approach is proposed in
[7] that uses optimum path forest for electricity theft detection
and outperforms SVM with an accuracy of 89%. To the best
of our knowledge, the best reported performance on a publicly
available data set was achieved by [1], which employs an SVM
classifier, with an average detection rate of 94% and a false
acceptance rate of 11%.
Deep learning techniques for electricity theft detection are
studied only in [14], where the author presents a comparison
between different deep learning architectures such as convo-
lutional neural networks (CNN), LSTM-RNNs, and stacked
auto-encoders. Nevertheless, only two types of cyberattacks are
presented and synthetic data is used to evaluate the performance
of the proposed models, which cannot be compared reliably
against models trained on real consumption data. Moreover,
the effect of fine-tuning the models hyper-parameters is not
studied in [14].
III. ENERGY CONSUMPTION DATA
Define a set of customers C, a set of days D = {1, . . . , D},
and a set of periods T = {1, . . . , T} of equal duration within
each day. A smart meter is installed for each customer to
regularly report the energy consumption for load monitoring
and billing. For each customer c, the energy consumption value
at a specific day d and time t is denoted as Ec(d, t). Hence,
each customer has an energy consumption record matrix Ec of
Table I
CYBER ATTACKS IN [1].
Cyber Attack
f1(Ec(d, t)) = αEc(d, t)
f2(Ec(d, t)) = β(d, t)Ec(d, t)
f3(Ec(d, t)) =
{
0 ∀t ∈ [ti(d), tf(d)]
Ec(d, t) ∀t /∈ [ti(d), tf(d)]
f4(Ec(d, t)) = E[Ec(d)]
f5(Ec(d, t)) = β(d, t)E[Ec(d)]
f6(Ec(d, t)) = Ec(d, T − t+ 1)
actual consumptions, where the rows of Ec span the days in
D, while the columns span the periods in T . The smart meter
reports the consumption to the utility for customer c on day d
and period t as Rc(d, t). An honest customer reports the actual
energy consumed at the end of the consumption period, and
hence, Rc(d, t) = Ec(d, t). On contrary, a malicious customer
aims to manipulate Ec(d, t) to lower its electricity bill by
modifying the smart meter readings. Hence, the cyberattack
is formally defined as Rc(d, t) = f(Ec(d, t)), where f(·)
denotes a cyberattack function that results in a reduced version
for the malicious customer electricity bill. Although it is easy
to collect honest samples for a customer c by monitoring
its reports to the utility, malicious reports might not be easy
to collect. This is because, the customer reports may all be
honest or it has not been detected previously as a malicious
customer. To tackle this problem, a set of cyberattack functions
were defined in [1] as indicated in Table I. Each function
f(·) creates a different attack scenario that aims to reduce the
customers’ energy consumption Ec(d, t). The first attack f1(·)
aims to reduce Ec(d, t) by some fraction, where α denotes
a flat reduction percentage. On the other hand, attack f2(·)
dynamically reduces Ec(d, t) by a value controlled by the time
function β(d, t). The third attack f3(·) represents a selective
time filtering function, where the malicious customer reports
zero reading during the interval [ti(d), tf(d)], otherwise, the
customer reports the actual consumption Ec(d, t). Here, ti(d)
and tf(d) denotes the initial and the final periods of the interval.
The next two attacks f4(·) and f5(·) are based on the expected
value of the energy consumption for the malicious customer
for a given day denoted by E[Ec(d)]. In f4(·) , the attacker
reports a flat value during the day, while in f5(·) the attacker
reduces E[Ec(d)] dynamically from time to time using function
β(d, t). The last attack f6(·) is a reverse function that reorders
the energy consumption reports during the day so that higher
reports are assigned to low tariff periods.
Applying the aforementioned cyber attacks on the energy
consumption record matrix Ec results in six matrices Mc,i,
where i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}, for each attack fi(·). The complete data
set for a customer is denoted as Xˆc, which is a concatenation
for Ec and all malicious matrices Mc,i. In addition, each
row Xc(d, ·) represents either an honest day sample (i.e, Ec
samples) labeled with 0 or a malicious sample (i.e., Mc,i
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Figure 1. Architecture of general RNN-based electricity theft detector.
samples) labeled with 1. Since Xˆc is an imbalanced dataset
where the ratio of the honest samples to the malicious samples
is 1:6, the detector may be biased towards the dominant class
category (i.e., malicious samples). To mitigate the bias effect,
the adaptive synthetic sampling approach (ADASYN) [20] is
used to oversample the minor class so that the ratio between
the honest and the malicious samples is almost the same. Each
data set Xˆc is partitioned into two disjoints data sets for model
evaluation, specifically, a training set Xˆc,TR and atesting set
Xˆc,TST with ratio 3:2. The training sets of all customers in C
are merged together to form XˆTR. Similarly, the test sets of
all customers are merged together to form XˆTST. Hence, all
customers have the same opportunity in training and evaluating
the general model. As different customers have different ranges
of energy consumption values during different report periods
T , different consumption periods have different opportunities
to influence the optimization algorithm for the final model.
Hence, in order to enforce equal opportunities for different
consumption periods, feature scaling is applied to XˆTR. The
mean and the variance of XˆTR are calculated and used to scale
XˆTR so that each consumption period would have zero mean
and unit standard deviation. The output of the feature scaling
stage is denoted as XTR. The same scaling scores are further
applied to the test set to get XTST.
To evaluate the performance of the detector, three metrics
are used as follows. The detection rate (DR) measures the
percentage of the correctly detected malicious attacks. The false
acceptance (FA) rate measures the percentage of the honest
samples that are falsely identified as malicious. The highest
difference (HD) measures the difference between DR and FA
[1] . The detection latency is ignored as electricity theft attacks
do not result in an immediate loss to the utility. Moreover,
malicious customers can be fined later for any detected thefts.
IV. DESIGN OF ELECTRICITY THEFT DETECTOR
This section describes the two stages used to develop the
RNN-based general detector. The first is a training stage that
Algorithm 1: Electricity Theft Detector Training
Data: XTR
Result: Optimal parameters U l(.),W
l
(.),V
l
(.), and b
l
(.)
∀l ∈ [1, . . . , L]
1 Initialization: Weights U l(.),W
l
(.),V
l
(.), and b
l
(.)
∀l ∈ [1, . . . , L], i = 1
2 while i 6= I do
3 Initialize: m = 1
4 while m 6= M do
5 for each training example x in mini-batch m do
6 Feed Forward:
7 for each recurrent layer l do
8 for each time step t do
9 zlt = σ(o
l−1
t U
l
z + s
l
t−1W
l
z + b
l
z)
10 rlt = σ(o
l−1
t U
l
r + s
l
t−1W
l
r + b
l
r)
11 hlt =
tanh(ol−1t U
l
h + (s
l
t−1  rl)W lh + blh)
12 slt = (1− zl) hl + zl  slt−1
13 olt = softmax(V
lslt + b
l
o)
14 end
15 end
16 Back propagation: Compute ∇U l
(.)
C(x),
∇V l
(.)
C(x), ∇W l
(.)
C(x), and ∇bl
(.)
C(x)
17 end
18 Weight and bias update:
19 U l(.) = U
l
(.) − ηK
∑
x∇U l(.)C(x)
20 V l(.) = V
l
(.) − ηK
∑
x∇V l(.)C(x)
21 W l(.) = W
l
(.) − ηK
∑
x∇W l(.)C(x)
22 bl(.) = b
l
(.) − ηK
∑
x∇bl(.)C(x)
23 end
24 end
describes the detector architecture and parameters, and the
second is the hyper-parameter optimization stage that uses a
random search-based approach for fine-tuning.
A. Training Stage
The architecture of the RNN-based general detector is shown
in Fig. 1. The input layer is denoted by vector xc(d), which
represents the consumption vector of customer c during day
d at different reporting periods t ∈ T . The RNN architecture
consists of L hidden GRU layers each with N neurons. Each
GRU layer except the last one accepts a sequence vector as
input and produces a sequence output vector. Unlike tradi-
tional feedforward layers, recurrent layers are more efficient
in exploiting patterns from sequential information. The out-
put layer has two neurons that define the malicious and the
honest classes, where the true label can be represented by
one-hot vector y(xc(d)) = (0 1)T for honest customers, and
y(xc(d)) = (1 0)
T for malicious customers.
The output vector from each layer l ∈ [1, . . . , L] is denoted
as ol, where o1 = x(d). Each hidden GRU layer l ∈ [2, . . . , L−
1] has the following parameters:
Algorithm 2: Random Search Hyper Parameters Optimiza-
tion
Data: XTR
Result: Optimal hyper parameters L∗,N∗,O∗, A∗H , and
A∗O
1 Initialization: Weights U l(.),W
l
(.),V
l
(.), and b
l
(.)
∀l ∈ [1, . . . , L], i = 1
2 while i 6= I do
3 L[i]← L , N [i]← N ,O[i]← O, AH [i]← AH ,
AO[i]← AO
4 for each X¯TR , X¯TST in k-folds(XTR) do
5 Apply Algorithm 1 using sampled
hyper-parameters and record DR, FA and
accuracy.
6 end
7 Record average values across folds DR[i], FA[i] and
accuracy[i].
8 end
9 Report the hyperparameters of the top three models.
• The input at time step t is ol−1t , which results from the
previous layer l − 1.
• The hidden state slt at time step t that represents the
memory computed based on the previous hidden state slt−1
of the same layer.
• The update gate zlt = σ(o
l−1
t U
l
z + s
l
t−1W
l
z + b
l
z), which
determines a combination between the new input ol−1t and
the previous memory slt−1. Here, U
l
z and W
l
z are learnable
weights, σ(.) is the activation function, and blz is the bias
vector.
• The reset gate rlt = σ(o
l−1
t U
l
r + s
l
t−1W
l
r + b
l
r), which
determines the amount of the previous memory slt−1 that
will contribute to the next state using the equation hlt =
tanh(ol−1t U
l
h + (s
l
t−1 rl)W lh + blh) . Here, U lr, W lr, U lh,
and W lh are learnable weight matrices, b
l
r and b
l
h are the
bias vectors, and  is the Hadamard product.
• The next state is simply slt+1 = (1−zl)hl+zlslt , and
the output at time t+ 1 is olt+1 = softmax(V
lslt+1 + b
l
o),
where V l is a learnable weight matrix.
The detector training stage involves learning the parameters
U l(.),W
l
(.),V
l
(.), and b
l
(.) for all layers, which results in the desired
output vector y(xc(d)) for any input xc(d). The optimization
objective to find these weights can be achieved by minimizing
the cross-entropy cost function C defined as
min
Θ
−1
S
∑
XTR
{yT(xc(d)) ln(oL)+
(1− yT(xc(d))) ln(1− oL)},
(1)
Where Θ denotes the RNN parameters U l(.),W
l
(.),V
l
(.), and b
l
(.)
for all layers and S represents the total number of the training
samples for all customers, which equals to the number of rows
in XTR. Solving (1) for the optimal parameters Θ is done using
an iterative gradient descent-based optimization algorithm. This
is achieved by partitioning XTR into M mini-batches of equal
size and executing Algorithm 1 for I total iterations. Each
iteration i has two main stages, namely, feed forward and back-
propagation. In the feed forward stage, the training samples in
the mini-batch are passed through all the network layers to
calculate the predicted output vectors. On the other hand, the
back propagation stage uses the mini-batches to calculate the
gradient of the cost function in (1) with respect to the network
weights [21]. Thereafter, the computed gradients are used to
modify the weights and biases for each iteration. Note that,
the back propagation within each layer is basically a back
propagation through time (BPTT) as each layer is a GRU.
In addition, ∇a in Algorithm 1 denotes the partial derivative
with respect to a. Algorithm 1 uses stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) for optimization with learning rate η.
B. Hyper-parameters Optimization Stage
Tuning the hyper-parameters of the detector is a challenging
and a time-consuming task, however, optimal parameters im-
prove the detector performance. Since an exhaustive search on
hyper-parameters is practically infeasible due to the incurred
high computational complexity, random search is used to find
a sub-optimal but an efficient solution in a reduced time
compared with the exhaustive grid search [18]. In this paper,
random search is used to tune the following hyper-parameters:
the network architecture in terms of the number of hidden layers
and the number of neurons within each hidden layer, the type
of activation functions used at the RNN layers, the type of
activation functions used at the output layer, and the type of gra-
dient descent-based optimization algorithm used in finding the
optimal RNN parameters (weights and biases) [21]. Denote L
andN as two uniform distributions that represent the number of
hidden layers and neurons to be sampled by the random search
algorithm. In addition, Let O represent a uniform distribution of
optimization algorithms that can include Adam, SGD, Adamax,
etc. [21]. Moreover, two uniform distributions are defined to
represent the set of activation functions used by the hidden and
output layers, namely, AH and AO, respectively. Algorithm
2 shows the random search over XTR for the selection of the
optimal hyper-parameters defined as P ∗. The maximum number
of search iterations is denoted as I , where at each iteration all
the distributions are sampled uniformly and the sampled model
is evaluated using K-fold cross-validation.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To evaluate the performance of the proposed RNN-based
general electricity theft detector, real smart meter data from
the Irish Smart Energy Trials is used [22]. The data set
was published by the Electric Ireland and Sustainable Energy
Authority of Ireland in January 2012. It contains the energy
consumption readings for 5000 customers over 536 days be-
tween 2009− 2010. The customers report their readings every
30 minutes (i.e., the RNN input size is 48), and hence, the total
number of reports per customer is 25, 728. Daily reports from
200 customers with 107, 200 days are considered as honest
energy consumption records, which are then used to launch the
Table II
SAMPLED HYPER-PARAMETERS RESULTS OF ALGORITHM 2 USING K-FOLD CROSS VALIDATION.
L N AH AO O DR FA HD Accuracy
2
201 Hard Sigmoid Sigmoid Adam 0.930 0.029 0.900 0.950
384 Sigmoid Sigmoid SGD 0.707 0.313 0.394 0.697
428 Sigmoid Softmax Adamax 0.946 0.036 0.910 0.955
270 Relu Sigmoid Nadam 0 0 0 0.499
306 Hard Sigmoid Softmax SGD 0.727 0.324 0.403 0.701
258 Hard Sigmoid Sigmoid SGD 0.713 0.311 0.402 0.701
154 Hard Sigmoid Softmax Adagrad 0.880 0.067 0.812 0.906
250 Tanh Sigmoid Adadelta 0.916 0.051 0.865 0.932
351 Sigmoid Softmax Adamax 0.941 0.035 0.905 0.952
284 Hard Sigmoid Softmax SGD 0.739 0.340 0.398 0.699
105 Tanh Sigmoid Adagrad 0.877 0.083 0.793 0.896
3
385 Tanh Sigmoid Adadelta 0.928 0.037 0.890 0.945
307 Sigmoid Sigmoid RMSprop 0.923 0.031 0.891 0.945
239 Tanh Sigmoid Adagrad 0.609 0.328 0.281 0.640
272 Hard Sigmoid Sigmoid Adadelta 0.885 0.071 0.813 0.906
110 Sigmoid Softmax Nadam 0.928 0.036 0.891 0.945
251 Tanh Sigmoid Nadam 0 0 0 0.499
310 Hard Sigmoid Softmax Adam 0.939 0.033 0.905 0.952
407 Hard Sigmoid Sigmoid Adagrad 0.867 0.075 0.791 0.895
193 Sigmoid Sigmoid Adadelta 0.875 0.068 0.807 0.903
4
492 Relu Sigmoid SGD 0 0 0 0.499
198 Tanh Softmax RMSprop 0.419 0.186 0.232 0.615
352 Sigmoid Softmax Adamax 0.931 0.026 0.905 0.952
215 Tanh Softmax Adamax 0.942 0.028 0.914 0.957
275 Tanh Softmax Adam 0 0 0 0.499
202 Relu Sigmoid Adagrad 0 0 0 0.499
393 Sigmoid Sigmoid RMSprop 0.939 0.044 0.894 0.947
165 Sigmoid Softmax Adagrad 0.898 0.073 0.825 0.912
390 Hard Sigmoid Sigmoid Adadelta 0.608 0.359 0.249 0.624
310 Tanh Sigmoid RMSprop 0.187 0.126 0.061 0.530
cyberattacks given in Table I for each customer. For cyberat-
tacks f1(·), f2(·), and f5(·), α and β(d, t) are random variables
that are uniformly distributed over the interval [0.1, 0.8] [1].
For attack f3(·), ti(d) is a uniform random variable in [0, 42],
and the duration of the attack, i.e., tf(d) − ti(d), is a uniform
random variable in [8, 48], and hence, the maximum value of
tf (d) = 48. Applying all cyberattacks for each customer results
in Xˆc data set which contains 536 honest samples (days) and
3, 216 malicious samples. Each sample in Xˆc has 48 energy
consumption values. For each Xˆc data set, over-sampling is
performed to balance the size of honest and malicious classes.
Consequently, the total size of each Xˆc data set contains a
total of 6, 432 honest and malicious samples. The total number
of samples for all c ∈ C is 1, 286, 400. Each Xˆc data set
is partitioned into training set Xˆc,TR and testing set Xˆc,TST
with ratio 3:2. The training sets for all customers are merged
together to form XˆTR. Similarly, the test sets for all customers
are merged together to form XˆTST. Feature scaling on training
data produces XTR and applying the same scores on the test
data produces XTST.
In Algorithm 1, the total number of epochs I = 10 and
the batch size is 350. For Algorithm 2, the options used for
the random search are the following: L = {2, 3, 4}, N =
[100, 500], O ={SGD, Adadelta, Adagrad , Adam, Adamax,
Nadam, RMSprop}, AH ={Sigmoid, Relu, Hard Sigmoid,
Tanh}, and AO ={Sigmoid, Softmax}. In addition, the total
number of iterations is I = 30, the drop out rate is set to 0.2
and the initialization of the network neurons is set to Glorot
Uniform [21]. All the experiments were performed on the high-
performance cluster (HPC) of the Tennessee Tech University
using two NVIDIA Tesla K80 GPUs. Tensorflow and Python
Keras Library are used for the implementation.
Table II gives the random search evaluation results obtained
by applying Algorithm 2 on the sampled hyper-parameters.
The results give the average detection performance over K-fold
cross-validation (with K = 3) on XTR in terms of DR, FA, and
HD. As indicated in the table, the proposed general electricity
theft detector benefits from the recurrent deep architecture
as the HD can achieve 91.4%. It can also be noticed that
all the networks that have Relu samples failed to optimize
properly, which is attributed to the finding discussed in [23]
in which deep sigmoidal networks can outperform deep Relu
networks if initialized properly. Moreover, all the networks with
SGD optimizer struggle to achieve good results, which can be
attributed to the small number of epochs used for the training.
Finally, all the promising models have Softmax activation for
the output layer. The top three models with respect to HD for
each number of layers l ∈ {2, 3, 4} are highlighted in Table II
Table III
AVERAGE PERFORMANCE OF THE THEFT DETECTOR.
MD1 MD2 MD3 [1]
DR (%) 93.4 92.5 92.7 94
FA (%) 6.9 5.0 5.3 11
HD (%) 86.4 87.4 87.4 83
and further used for performance evaluation using the test set
XTST.
Table III gives a comparison between the top three models
highlighted in Table II and the model proposed in [1], which
was tested by the same data used in this paper. The first three
columns in Table III give the average performance results when
using the best hyper-parameters highlighted in Table II, such
that the models with l = 2, l = 3 , and l = 4 are represented by
MD1, MD2, and MD3, respectively. The last column gives the
results from [1]. While the detector in [1] is trained on the same
dataset used in this paper, it is a customer-specific electricity
theft detector based on a shallow machine learning architecture
(SVM). As indicated in Table II, the best HD is achieved when
MD2 or MD3 hyper-parameters are applied, which outperforms
the proposed detector in [1] by a 4% increase. Moreover, the
FA is improved by almost 55%. The results indicate that an
improvement in the electricity theft detection performance can
be achieved using RNN architecture. In addition, our proposed
detector is a general model that does not rely on a specific
customer data. Hence, it is more robust against contamination
attacks compared with the proposed detector in [1].
VI. CONCLUSION
A general RNN-based electricity theft detector is proposed.
The proposed detector exploits the time series nature of the
customers’ energy consumption to implement GRU deep hid-
den layers that can learn complex patterns of customers’ con-
sumption yielding better detection performance. Random search
is employed to tune the detector hyper-parameters and further
improve the performance. Load profiles comprising 107, 200
days for different customers over two years are the basis for
the experiments. The proposed RNN-based detector achieves a
detection rate up to 93% and a false acceptance rate as low as
5%, which presents a 55% reduction in false acceptance, and
4% improvement in the highest difference rate compared with
a benchmark detector in the literature. Moreover, the proposed
detector is more robust against contamination attacks as it does
not rely on a specific customer data.
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